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 
Abstract— Online social networks, such as Facebook and 
Twitter, have gained popularity in recent years.  With that 
popularity, come security problems, especially problems with 
information privacy.  This paper provides an overview of 
information privacy issues for online social networks. One way to 
solve this problem is to use cryptography. However, 
cryptography on online social networks has not been studied 
exclusively. Most works have been done on access control. The 
main issue with cryptography is the number of keys needed to 
encrypt and decrypt the information. The most obvious number 
of keys would be to use one key for every user in our group of 
friends. This is not needed or entirely true as we show here. This 
paper, therefore, gives an attempt to show that the number of 
keys needed to achieve secure sharing among friends can in fact 
be much smaller than the number of friends. The number of keys 
can actually be reduced by approximately 500% on average, 
using the method presented here. We also provide proofs of 
correctness and security to confirm our claim. 
 
Index Terms— Cryptography, Key, Security, Social Networks 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
OWADAYS, online social networks such as Facebook 
and Twitter have gained a lot of popularity. They have 
become an essential tool for communicating with family and 
friends. The number of active users has increased more and 
more in the past years, with Facebook having over 1 billion 
users [1]. When the network grows, there are always concerns 
over security, whose problems have been stated in [2, 3]. 
Having said that, to the best of our knowledge, there has not 
been a paper discussing how cryptography can be used to 
improve security on online social networks. Most of the works 
that we have come across appear to focus on access controls 
[4, 5, 6, 7] or collaborative watchdog [8].  That is, they apply 
similar mechanisms that can restrict access to contents being 
shared online. By restricting access, we mean that only friends 
will have the permission to see the contents. 
However, as we have shown in [9] that the existing 
mechanisms only restrict access on the Web interface. That is, 
even though the restrictions have been set, users without 
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permission can easily capture messages and read them. 
Therefore, we say that information privacy is still an issue of 
concern. One way to ease the privacy problem is to use 
cryptography. By applying cryptography, messages can be 
encrypted and only be read by the people, who are authorised 
to do so.  
Cryptography is not without its problems, though. One of 
the problems that can be foreseen when applying to online 
social networks would be the number of keys needed to be 
held by each user. This paper provides a way to look at online 
social networks and work out the number of keys needed. We 
show that the number of keys need not be the same as the 
number of friends we have. Rather, it could be smaller than 
that by the way the social networks are looked at. Proofs of 
correctness/security by the GNY logic [10] are also 
summarised here. It has to be stressed here that we do not 
attempt to design a new algorithm for key establishment since 
there are already many [11, 12]. The purpose of our research 
for the paper is to show and prove that the number of keys 
does not have to be as many as the number of friends we have.  
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section II contains 
an overview of the work related to this paper. Section III gives 
an overview of how we chose to look at our network of 
friends. Section IV shows the number of keys needed for a 
group of friends using a naïve method, with a proof. Section V 
presents the actual number of keys needed for a group of 
friends together with proofs. Section VI concludes our 
findings.  
 
II. RELATED WORK 
A. Social Graph 
Many sociologists and computer scientists now look at a 
social network as a graph [13, 14, 15]. That is, a social 
network contains users as vertices and relationships between 
them as edges. This can be put in mathematical term as G = 
(V, E); where G is a graph or a social network, V is the vertices 
or users in the graph and E is the edges or relationships 
connecting the vertices.  
Due to the growth of online social networks, many have 
studied the structure and properties of those social graphs, with 
the work of Ugander et al. [14] being the most up to date and 
probably the most complete. Ugander at al. [14] studied the 
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structure of the social graph of active Facebook users, which 
the authors claimed that it is “the largest social network ever 
analysed.” Their study showed that the average Facebook 
users had around 190 friends, with the median friend count of 
99. The authors also found that the average distance between 
any pairs of users (not necessarily friends) was 4.6, which 
confirmed the “six degrees of separation” theory. Furthermore, 
within a graph of friends, [14] discovered that, on average, 
14% of individuals formed a connected subgraph. This means 
that those users are friends among themselves, too. The notion 
of a connected subgraph or friends within a graph of friends 
had previously been introduced in [16].  It was known as a 
clique. 
The idea of cliques or connected subgraphs would be an 
important component in our attempt in reducing the number of 
keys needed for each user within a group of one-hop friends. 
In graph theory, there are many types of graphs. However, 
only two types are of our interests here. They are undirected 
graph and directed graph. Let us give the definitions of the two 
types of graphs here. 
An undirected graph is a graph in which edges have no 
orientation. That is, the edge (a, b) is identical to the edge (b, 
a). Figure 1 is a simple example of an undirected graph. 
A directed graph, to put it simply, is the opposite of an 
undirected graph, i.e., it is a graph in which edges have 
orientation. That is, the edge (a, b) is not the same as the edge 
(b, a). Figure 2 shows a simple example of a directed graph. 
These two types of graphs would also be an important 
ingredient to our step towards better security for the 
information on online social networks. 
 
B. Gong Needham Yahalom or GNY Logic 
The GNY logic is a formal tool that allows us to analyse 
cryptographic protocol step by step according to the rules 
provided in [10]. A protocol, in this context, consists of the 
exchange of some network messages between two or more 
principals. A protocol determines what and when messages 
should be sent, and by which particular principal. Each 
protocol run is referred to as a session.  
When analysing a protocol, we begin with a set of initial 
assumptions. The appropriate rules (Being-told, Possession, 
Freshness, Recognisability, Message interpretation and 
Jurisdiction rules, usually in this order) are then applied to 
each of the received messages. Once the analysis is finished, 
the protocol should end up with the expected outcomes. If in 
any case the analysis does not terminate, or the protocol does 
not achieve the expected conclusions, the feature of the GNY 
protocol is that it allows the user to see at which step the 
analysis is stuck or potentially can be attacked. In other words, 
the analysis allows us to realise which essential components 
are missing from which message, or what attacks are possible 
at what stage of the protocol.  
We refer the readers to [10] for the explanations of 
notations and rules. 
 
III. NETWORK OF FRIENDS 
In order to achieve our goal in deducing the actual number 
of keys needed to have a more secure sharing between friends, 
we take the concept of social graph or a graph as a way to look 
at the network of friends. 
Let us take an opportunity here to say a little bit more about 
the work of this paper. This paper, as mentioned, attempts to 
find a number of keys needed to be held by a person so that he 
or she can share messages with his friends and can read posts 
from his or her friends. Therefore, the easiest way to 
understand this is the look at one user at a time. We will try to 
establish a number of keys needed to be held by that person so 
that secure sharing with his or her friends is possible. Figure 3 
shows a typical network of one-hop friends of user A. 
By looking at a group of friends as a graph, it gives us a 
clearer view towards to solution of finding out the number of 
keys needed by user A. By studying extensively, [14] 
suggested that it is possible that among the n friends of user A, 
some of them are also friends with one another. In other 
words, within the network of friends, a connected subgraph or 
subgraphs can be found. Figure 4 shows a connected subgraph 
within a group of friends, i.e., the nodes in the dotted 
 
Fig. 1.  An undirected graph. The graph shows that the edges have no 
orientation. That is, the edge (a, b) is identical to the edge (b, a).  
A
 
Fig. 3.  A typical network of one-hop friends of user A. This is how a group 
of friends on online social network should be looked at. We can think of this 
network as a graph, with each node representing a person. In the Figure, all 
the black nodes are one-hop friends of user A.  
 
Fig. 2.  A directed graph. The graph shows that the edges have orientation. 
That is, the edge (a, b) is not the same as the edge (b, a). 
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perimeter.  
Here, it seems appropriate to give a couple of definitions. In 
the dotted perimeter, each node, as mentioned, would have an 
edge connected to every other node. This is known as a 
connected subgraph, which would be known as a clique from 
now. Clique was first introduced in [16]. 
Definition 1. A clique is “a set of more than two people … 
if they are all mutual friends of one another.” [16] 
From Definition 1, the nodes within the dotted perimeter in 
Figure 2 form a clique. This would leave the other nodes (ones 
that are not in a clique). We think it would be appropriate to 
call them isolated nodes, which is defined below. 
Definition 2. An isolated node is a node or a user with no 
mutual friends, or a node or a user that is not part of any 
clique. 
All the studies of social graph have indicated that social 
networks are thought of as an undirected graph. That is, the 
edges represent a reciprocal relationship between nodes. 
However, for the purpose of using cryptography to secure 
message transmission, social networks cannot be looked at as 
an undirected graph. In our opinion, it is best to look at them 
as a directed graph. This is because when user A shares with 
his one-hop friends, one key is used for encryption (and 
decryption). One the other hand, when B (a friend of A’s) 
shares, he or she needs another key for encryption (and 
decryption), because B’s friends may not be the same as A’s. 
Hence, we claim here that when considering cryptography, it 
would be best to think of a social network as a directed graph, 
rather than an undirected one as usual. 
From what we have explained, a group of friends can be 
thought of as a graph. It is possible, from the study in [14], for 
a graph to have at least one clique. This would leave the 
remaining nodes as isolated nodes. We claim that this is one 
way to look at online social networks, and is also a way 
towards our goal. 
IV. NUMBER OF KEYS IN A NAÏVE METHOD 
When attempting to find the number of keys needed to be 
help by a user, referring to Figure 3 and Figure 4, the simplest 
way is as follows. User A must possess a key for encrypting 
everything he shares with his friends. Moreover, the user A 
must also hold a different key for every user he is friends with, 
since for cryptography the graph is directed. That is, the 
number of keys held by user A is 1 plus the number of friends 
that user A has, or the number of keys is the same as the 
number of people in that particular group of friends. 
Let n be the number of all the people in the group, including 
user A. We claim that the number of keys needed by the user 
is: 
      n = 1 + (n – 1)   for n > 1         (1) 
Proof. We say that Equation 1 is only true for when n > 1, 
because when n = 1 there is only one person in the group. No 
communications would be needed, so the number of keys 
would be zero. 
We begin our simple proof by induction with n = 2. Here, it 
is important to keep in mind that we are trying to find the 
number of keys for one user, so we look at one user as a 
“centred” user, user A in this case. 
 Let n = 2. When n = 2, a user needs one key to share posts 
and one other key to read posts from the other user. 
(2) = 1 + ((2) – 1) 
2 = 2 
 Let n = k. When n = k, a user needs one key to share posts 
and k-1 other keys to read posts from others. 
(k) = 1 + ((k) – 1) 
k = k 
 Let n = k+1. When n = k+1, a user needs one key to share 
posts and k other keys to read posts from others. 
(k+1) = 1 + ((k+1) – 1) 
 k+1 = k+1                                        □ 
 It is not difficult to see that using a naïve method a user 
needs to hold n keys, which is equal to the number of people in 
the group of one-hop friends of that user, including the user 
him/herself. The next section will try to reduce the number of 
keys by applying the idea of cliques and isolated nodes to our 
approach. 
V. NUMBER OF KEYS IN A “BETTER” METHOD 
It has been established and shown in Section II that within a 
group of nodes, it is possible to have one or more connected 
subgraphs or cliques, and the non-clique nodes are said to be 
isolated. It is the ideas of cliques and isolated nodes the 
number of keys needed to be held by any individuals can be 
lower than n, where n is the number of people in a particular 
group. By using these ideas, it can be seen that a group of 
nodes can be divided into two parts: cliques and non-cliques or 
isolated nodes. We take a look at each part in turn.  
A. Part I: Cliques 
By definition, a clique is “a set of more than two people … 
if they are all mutual friends of one another.” To put this 
simply, everyone knows everyone in a clique, or everybody is 
friends with everybody in a clique. This implies that everyone 
trusts one another. Since all nodes in the clique trust each 
other, we claim that it is possible to achieve secure sharing 
within the clique using just one key. We backup this claim by 
carrying out the proof of correctness/security using the GNY 
logic. 
Proof. Assume that all nodes in a clique have established a 
key, K, using such secure group key establishment protocol as 
A
 
Fig. 4.  A connected subgraph within a group of friends. The black nodes 
within the dotted perimeter are friends among themselves. This means that 
these nodes all know one another. In terms of graph, each node would have 
an edge connected to every other node in the perimeter. 
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[11]. Also assume that a symmetric encryption algorithm used 
is secure. 
For the simplicity of the proof, we say that node A shares a 
post with other members in the clique. Let us also call all other 
members in the clique m. The purpose of the proof is to show 
that A can share with other nodes in the clique securely. 
A       m: m      *{*Msg, *Na, *A}K 
where Msg is a message A shares with the rest of the clique; 
           Na is a nonce (number used once) generated by A; 
           A is the identity of the node A; and 
           {x}K is the symmetric encryption of message x using the  
        key K. 
Analysis: 
 In carrying out the GNY analysis, we apply postulates T1, 
T3, P1, F1, R1 and J1 in this order to obtain m |≡  Msg, Na, A. 
We refer the readers to our work in [17] for the detailed proof. 
 From the proof, the GNY logic terminates at the end of the 
final postulate, J1. We claim that this sharing is secure. That 
is, at the end, the following outcomes are achieved. m or all 
other nodes in the clique believe that A is the one sharing a 
message. They also believe that the message has been 
encrypted and transmitted by A, using the key K known only 
by the nodes in the clique. (When another node within the 
clique shares a post, the same proof can be used with the same 
outcomes.) 
 From the proof above, we claim that using only one key K, 
all nodes in the clique can achieve secure sharing among 
themselves. □ 
B. Part II: Isolated Nodes 
The second part is for the non-clique nodes, which are 
known as isolated nodes in this paper. By the definition given 
in Section III, these are the nodes that are not in any clique. It 
is, therefore, easy to see that for a user to be able to see a post 
shared by each isolated node, one key is needed. To put it 
another way, an isolated node needs one key to encrypt 
anything he or she wants to share with the individuals he or she 
is friends with. 
From what has been stated above, we say that for a user A, 
the number of keys needed in order to see posts shared by his 
or her isolated friends is equal to the number of isolated 
friends. Moreover, the user A would also want to share, which 
means that he or she needs another key to encrypt those 
messages. Therefore, we get: Let n be the number of all 
isolated nodes plus user A. 
                  The number of keys = 1 + (n – 1)  for n > 1    (2) 
It can easily be seen that the Equation 2 is the same as the 
one in the naïve method. Therefore, the proof showing that the 
number of key is true is exactly the same, too. We refer 
readers to Section III for the proof by induction for this 
equation. 
It is now left to us to show that when an isolated user shares 
something, it is sufficient and secure enough to use just one 
key. Again, we prove this by using the GNY logic. However, 
before carrying out the proof and analysis, a couple of 
assumptions need to be made. 
Firstly, it is assumed that an isolated node and the user A 
have established a key K using such secure key establishment 
method as [12]. Secondly, it is assumed that a symmetric 
encryption algorithm used when sharing is secure. 
Proof. Let us call an isolated node B and call a user A. Let 
us also say that the isolated node A shares something with his 
or her friends, but since the node is isolated (in this particular 
group), only user B can see it in this group. 
B       A: A      *{*Msg, *Nb, *B}K 
where Msg is a message A shares with the rest of the clique; 
           Nb is a nonce (number used once) generated by B; 
           B is the identity of the node A; and 
           {x}K is the symmetric encryption of message x using the  
           key K. 
Analysis: 
In carrying out the GNY analysis, we apply postulates T1, 
T3, P1, F1, R1 and J1 in this order to obtain A |≡  Msg, Nb, B. 
Again, we refer the readers to our work in [17] for the detailed 
proof. 
From the proof, the GNY logic terminates at the end of the 
final postulate, J1. We claim that this sharing is secure. That 
is, at the end, the following outcomes are achieved. User A 
believes that the isolated node B shares a message. User A also 
believes that the message has been encrypted and transmitted 
securely by B, using the key K. 
From the proof above, we claim that by using a single key 
K, an isolated node B achieves secure sharing with the user A 
within this group. □ 
C. What is the number of keys in total? 
So far, it has been established that when our friends share or 
post, we need: one key to see each of the isolated nodes’ posts 
and one key to see posts from any node in a clique. 
This means that in our group of friends, the number of keys 
needed to read or see posts from our friends equals the number 
of isolated nodes plus the number of cliques within the group. 
Furthermore, we also need one key to encrypt the posts that we 
share with our friends. Therefore, the number of keys needed 
to be held is: 
                              nk = niso + nc + 1                                 (3) 
where nk is the total number of keys; 
           niso is the number of isolated nodes; and 
           nc is the number of cliques in the group. 
From Equation 3, it is obvious that the number of keys 
depends on the number of cliques and the number of isolated 
nodes. The equation we have established here clearly shows 
that the number of keys is smaller than the number obtained 
from the naïve method. The only way that the number of keys 
will be the same is when there are no cliques in the group, 
which is very unlikely especially in a large group of friends, as 
suggested in [14]. In addition, [14] also mentioned that the 
larger the group the more mutual friendships exist. That is, 
when a group becomes larger, or a user has more and more 
friends, it is almost always the case that more than one clique 
exists. This, from our equation, means that more cliques equal 
fewer isolated users which lead to smaller number of keys. 
Furthermore, what the equation does not show is that bigger 
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cliques also equal fewer isolated users which also lead to 
smaller number of keys. We, therefore, claim that we have 
achieved our primary goal in attempting to reduce the total 
number of keys needed to be held by each user in online social 
networks. 
D. The Average Number of Keys 
A general equation has been formed in the previous section 
to calculate the number of keys. However, without knowing 
the exact number of cliques and isolated users, it is still 
difficult to work out the number of keys needed by an 
individual. This section will try to go a step further to assist in 
the calculation of the number of keys. Even though the exact 
number may not be found, the equations in this section should 
be less generalised than the previous one. 
Equation 3 contains two variables. They are the number of 
clique nc and the number of isolated nodes niso. Let us begin by 
taking a look at the number of cliques. 
By definition, a clique must contain at least three nodes. 
That means if there are n nodes in our one-hop friend network. 
The number of cliques could be: 
                                  1 ≤ nc ≤ ⌊n/3⌋                                       (4) 
What this equation tells us is that it is not possible to find an 
equation that would give an exact number of keys. They best 
we could do is to form an inequality. That is, it is now possible 
to form an equation that would give us a range of number of 
keys for any number of cliques. This is explained in detail 
below. 
Suppose there are n nodes in a typical social network. The 
following cases could occur. 
If the number of cliques is one, it means that the number of 
nodes in this clique could be between three and n nodes. This 
suggests that the number of isolated nodes will be: 
                                0 ≤ niso ≤ n – 3,                                  (5) 
where  3 is the minimum number of nodes in a clique. 
 If the number of cliques is two, and the minimum number of 
nodes in a clique must be three, the number of nodes that are 
in any clique could range between six (2 cliques x 3 nodes) 
and n nodes. This suggests that the number of isolated nodes 
will be: 
                                0 ≤ niso ≤ n – (2*3),                                (6) 
where  3 is the minimum number of nodes in a clique, and 
            2 is the number of cliques. 
 If the number of cliques is three, and the minimum number 
of nodes in a clique must be three, the number of nodes that 
are in any clique could range between nine (3 cliques x 3 
nodes) and n nodes. This suggests that the number of isolated 
nodes will be: 
                               0 ≤ niso ≤ n – (3*3),                                 (7) 
where  the first 3 is the minimum number of nodes in a clique, 
            the second 3 is the number of cliques. 
 It has been established in Equation 4 that the maximum 
number of clique in a social network would occur when each 
of every clique contains three nodes. That is, the maximum 
number of cliques is ⌊n/3⌋. We get: 
 If the number of cliques is ⌊n/3⌋, and the minimum number 
of nodes in a clique must be three, the number of nodes that 
are in all cliques combined could range between (⌊n/3⌋ cliques 
x 3 nodes) and n nodes. This suggests that the number of 
isolated nodes will be: 
                          0 ≤ niso ≤ n – (⌊n/3⌋*3),                             (8) 
where  3 is the minimum number of nodes in a clique, and 
          ⌊n/3⌋ is the maximum number of cliques. 
What we have gained from the equations 4 to 8 is another 
equation that would help us work out the number of keys 
needed to be held by a user. Having said that, it is not possible 
to form an equation that would give an exact number since the 
actual number of cliques and isolated nodes is unknown. 
Therefore, the best that our equation below could do is to 
provide a range of possible number of keys held by a user. 
Applying the above equations, when the number of nodes n 
≥ 3, the number of keys nk could be: 
                   1 ≤ nk ≤ ⌊n/3⌋+n-(⌊n/3⌋*3)+1                         (9) 
After simplification of the Equation 9, we get: 
                           1 ≤ nk ≤ n-2⌊n/3⌋+1                              (10) 
Equation 10 allows us to find the average number of keys to 
be held by a typical user on an online social network. The 
results are depicted in Figure 5 below. 
It can be seen from Figure 5 that when the number of friends 
increases, the number of keys needed by a user also increases. 
In contrast, if we compare our method to the naïve method, the 
rate of increase is much smaller. In other words, for example 
in the naïve method shown in Section IV, if the number of 
friends is 200, the number of keys needed by a person will be 
201. However, using our method, the number of keys, as 
shown in the graph, would only be 35. This is the decrease of 
more than 500%. 
The graph is not a straight line, i.e., a zigzag line, because as 
the number of friends grows, it is more likely that those friends 
will join in a clique. This makes the number of keys smaller. 
From everything that has been done here, it can be seen in 
the graph that using our method, the number of keys is much 
smaller than the naïve method. This, we claim, is a way to ease 
concerns on using cryptography on online social networks. 
Hence, it is a step towards better privacy of information on 
 
Fig. 5.  Average number of keys held by a user with the number of friends 
ranging from 0 to 300.  
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online social networks. 
This section has provided a different way to look at online 
social networks. The concept of social graphs has been applied 
in making a step towards securing data. That is, the idea of 
clique has been used and the idea of isolated nodes has been 
introduced. We have also scrapped the thoughts that social 
networks are undirected graph (users’ relationship are 
reciprocal), because when cryptography is deployed different 
keys are needed to send and receive posts. That means in order 
to secure online social networks by using cryptography, the 
social networks must be looked at as a directed graph instead. 
Here, it has been shown that by using a naïve method, the 
number of keys to be held by each user will be equal to the 
number of users. However, a “better” method has been 
introduced to reduce the number of keys. We have also proved 




The growth of online social networks has led to security and 
privacy concerns. Many researchers have tried to improve the 
security mechanisms. However, their work appears to focus on 
access control mechanisms rather than cryptography. It has 
been stated in this paper that the main issue with cryptography 
when applying to online social networks is the number of keys 
needed. A naïve method has shown that the number of keys 
would have to be equal to the number of users in the network. 
Our contributions in this research include the way we look 
at social networks and a method used to reduce the number of 
keys. First of all, as suggested by many, online social networks 
can be considered as an undirected graph. In other words, 
friendship is reciprocal on the network. However, we claim 
that, in order to apply cryptography, social network must be 
considered as a directed graph instead. This idea would lead us 
to bring in the concept of cliques and introduce a definition of 
isolated nodes, which helped us derive a formula for the 
number of keys in the end. 
By applying the ideas of cliques and isolated nodes, we have 
been able to derive an equation that helps us in calculating a 
range and an average of the number of keys needed for an 
individual user. The graph shows that by using our method, we 
are able to reduce the number of keys approximately by a 
factor of five, which is a significant amount. Having said that, 
the actual number of keys still depends on how many cliques 
there are in a social network of one-hop friends, how many 
users are in each clique and how many isolated users there are. 
On the whole, we have been able to make the number of 
keys needed much smaller than the naïve method. Even though 
the number of keys is smaller, the security still remains as 
shown in the proofs and analyses. In our opinion, this, at least, 
is a way towards better information privacy on online social 
networks. 
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